A Study of the Problems of Translation, Rhetorical Analysis, and Translation of a Speech of Mohammed Mossedeq by Janati-Ataie, Gholamhosain
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses
6-1973
A Study of the Problems of Translation, Rhetorical Analysis, and
Translation of a Speech of Mohammed Mossedeq
Gholamhosain Janati-Ataie
Portland State University
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of
PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Janati-Ataie, Gholamhosain, "A Study of the Problems of Translation, Rhetorical Analysis, and Translation of a Speech of Mohammed
Mossedeq" (1973). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 2034.
10.15760/etd.2033
--------- - ------- -
AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Gholamhosain Janati-Ataie for 
the Master of Arts in Speech presented June 22, 1973. 
'Title: A Study of the Problems of Translation, Rhetorical 
Analysis, and Translation of a Speech of Mohammed 
Mossedeq. 
-APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: 
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St~pll~1r.1KOSOkoIf, Chdifman • 
Theodore G. Grove " I 
Through the translation and analysis of a major speech, 
the political thought and rhetorical devices of Mohammed 
Mossedeq, former Prime Minister of Iran (1951-1953), are 
examined. Just as cultural and philosophical differences 
account for many problems in such a translation, so have 
they led to Mossedeq's being largely misunderstood' in the 
----------- -
2 
West. The study therefore presents a more positive view of 
Mossedeq, emphasizing his nationalism, which has inspired 
countless movements toward independence among the Third 
World nations. Chapters deal with the background of the 
study, problems of translation (including the semantic and 
lexical nonequivalences between languages, as well as 
cultural differences), and significant details from 
Mossedeq's biography, in addition to the principal trans-
lation, rhetorical analysis, and summary chapters. 
Mossedeq was deeply aware of the politica1 problems 
of Iran, the most important of which were: (1) the inter-
ference of foreign powers, especially England and the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; (2) the total corruption of the 
. Iranian government; and (3) the lack of political awarene,ss 
and education of the Iranian people. A major solution to 
the first problem was Iran's nationalization of her oil re-
sources. The main speech reflects this event and its im-
pact on Iran, as well as on the rest of the wor1d, in the 
larger context of the need for the Iranians to unite and 
become conscious of their power and resources. 
The speech outlines Mossedeq's political motives, his 
plans for alleviating Iran's government and people. It also 
illustrat~s Mossedeq's charismatic appeal: he was a 
skilled speaker, one wh9 stirred his audiences, whether they 
were members of the Iranian parliament (Majlis). 'or illit~ 
era1=e peasants. His language was simple ye't highly com-
"municative--and no one before him had ever received such 
. ' , ' 
publi.c s.upport in Iran. 
3 
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PREFACE 
Interest in the problem underlying this study evolved 
. from my introduction to English as a second language. Hav-
·ing come from Iran, a Farsi-speaking land, I soon realiz.ed 
that the most important phenomenon for understanding and 
communicating among people is language. And being involved 
constantly in the problems of moving from one language to 
'another, I came to the clear realization that translation 
is merely inte~pretation and, when it involves deeper con-
cepts, next to impossible. 
Although I make no qlaims to have solved the basic 
,problems of translation, I do feel--especially since I am 
bilingual--that I have reached an understanding of some of 
them, w~ich I hope to pass on to the reader. Much can be 
gained through comparative study, analysis, and research, 
including mutual understanding and appreciation, to which 
. this study is dedicated. 
---._----- - ._---- ---_. ----
---._-- --
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CHAPTER I 
,INTRODUCTION. 
As '1951 drew to a close, Time magazin~'s co~ittee 
for Man of the Year gathered around a big' table to ma~e a 
decision. The choice ,was 'not an easy one. There were at 
l~ast seven nominees, including such world-renowned men as 
Matthew Ridgway, John Foster Dulles, Harry Trmnan, Winston 
Churchill, Dwight Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur. Yet 
',the man f~nally chosen was a far less well-known Iranian 
statesman, once described by former United States Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson as, 
the character Lob in James Barrie's play' Dear Brutus. 
He was small and frail with not a shred of hair on 
his billiard-ball head; a thin face protruded into a 
long beak of a nose flanked by two bright, shoe-
button eyes. His whole manner and appearance was 
birdlike, marked by quick nervous movements as he 
seemed to jump about on a perch. l 
The man was Mohammed Mossedeq, whose selection Time 
announced as follows: 
In its leadership of the non-communist world, the 
United States has some dire responsibilities to 
1 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Yea'rs in 
the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969),' p. 503. 
shoulder. One of them is to meet the fundamental 
". moral challenge posed by the strange old wizard who 
'lives in a mountainous land and who· is . • • the man 
of 1951. 2 
2 
Mohammed Mossedeq's achievements have yet.to be stud7 
ied and assessed objective1y:.' Sources of material on the 
man and his accomplishments, except for those in the origi-
na1 Farsi language, are few and inadequate. Far this reason 
a rhetorical .analysis and careful translation a! Mossedeq's 
historical speeches is of vital importance. 
According to Richard W. Cottam in Nationalism in !ran, 
That· Time magazine, for example, should have cho·seri. 
Mossedeq as its man of the year in 1952.seems now to 
have been almost aberrant. Time's cover story of 
Mossedeq could hardly have pleased Mossedeq's sup-. 
porters; but they.ignored the story and revelled in 
the implication of Mossedeq's selection. The choice 
of Mossedeq was made because he symbolized the emer-
gence in the Middle East of a popular force capable 
of establishing itself in power •.• Mossedeq's 
premiership remains extremely significant; b6th the 
triumphs and the eventual defeat of Iranian National-
ism need to be surveyed if Iranian nationalism is to 
be understood. 3 
Mossedeq was the first man from the Middle East in 150 
·year~ who stood against the world's greatest imperialist 
power, England. Though his stay in power was short, he 
made many important contributions to Iran as well as other 
2 
"Man of the Year; Challenge of the East,n Time, 
January 7, 1952, p. 21. 
3Richard W. cottam', Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: 
.Pittsburgh University Press, 1964), p. 269. 
.-~-..... ---.. ----- ---.- --
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Third World countries. This is one reason for the interest 
in Mossedeq displayed by his'torians and political scien-
. . 4 . 
tists. . 
The aim of ,this study is to be objective. Therefore, 
both the positive and,negative aspects of Mossedeq's polit-
ica'l contribution will be explored • 
. On the positive side, Mossedeq is credited as being 
the man who started, the Third World uprising against imperi-
a~ist powers. Although twenty years have elaps~d, Mossedeq 
i 
i~ still very popular today in the under-developed coun-
tries. In fact, leaders like Castro, Ben Bella, Sukarno, 
Nkrumah, Nas$er, and even Nehru credit Mossedeq for being 
th · . . t· 5 el..r l..nspl..ra l..on. 
The negative viewpoint concentrates mainly on 
Mossedeq's political mistakes and on his being a member of 
a ruling-class family, as well a~ on his being fanatically 
-nationalistic or'~oo idealistic. It is suggested that per-
haps taking on the major world powers was too big a task 
for him. 
In spite of the claims of either his opposition or his 
, followers, history shows that whatever ~1ossedeq said he act-
ed upon. Mossedeq had much convincing to do, and despite 
4 Ibid ., pp. 259-285. 
5 M. Makan, A Look Into the Life of Dr. Mohammed 
Mossedeq (n.p.: Iranian National Front in Europe, 1964), 
p. 4. 
+ _._.---
all the problems that confronted him, he was immensely 
per·suasive. 
According to Aristotle, "The modes of persuasion are 
the'only true constituents of the art [rhetoric]: every-
tl:l·ing else is. merely accessory. n 6 In this study, we are 
4 
conce~ned with the oratory of a major nationalist leader as 
a means of persuasion. 
What Mossedeq stood for is to be found in the total 
substance of his speeches made across half a century: Iran 
for the Iranians~ nationalization of oil throughout Irani 
giving no concession to any foreign government or qorpor~-
tion; elimination of corruption within the Iranian govern-
ment at all levels; and correction and enforce~ent ot' 
election laws nationally as well as locally. The speeches 
chosen for translation in this study. illustrate. Mossedeq's 
rhetoric concerning these issues. 
Through careful translation, and investigation of the 
strategies and tactics of his speeches, we hope to acquire 
an understanding of Mossedeq's use of rhetorical devices. 
A study of Mossedeq's rhetoric may also provide insight into 
the phenomenon o~ motivating the masses to action. 7 
6Aristotle Rhetoric 1. l354al. 13. 
7This phenomenon was witnessed by Richard W. Cottam 
during his first stay in Iran in 1951-52. He notes in 
Nationalism in Iran that "the first period was the apex of 
.the Mossedeq era, and the Iran I saw had much verve" (p. vii). 
~nti-Mossedeq sources are plentiful. However, the 
aim of this study is not to add to those sources. On the 
contrary, the emphasis throughout is on bringing to light, 
5 
, t!irough translation, 'the pro-Mossedeq 'literature. This, em-
phasis is intentional, since, much can be learned throu,gh" 
comparative studies. That is, the propaganda of anti-
Mossedeqists permit the analyst to reconstruct .their image 
Of, Mossedeq, while the vigorous Mossedeqist publications . 
provide an excelient base of comparison. 
This study attempts ,to maintain an analytical ap-
proach. However, avoiding making value judgments on 
Mossedeq's political ends and the means to them is not an 
easy task. But the greatest difficulty to surmount in a 
study such as this one is the difference in cu~tural back-
grounds--in this case, between East and West. As Charles 
Malik of Lebanon has commented on the Western attitude 
toward the Near East, 
The Western world is responsible for the situation 
in the Near East on "every level of that situation 
• ". •• Stra tegy, commerce ," exploitation, securing 
an imperial route: these were why the West for the 
most part came to the Near East, not because it 
loved us. Add to this the immense racial arrogance 
of modern Europe." The West has not been true to 
itself~ and therefore it could not have been true 
to us.ts 
8Charles Malik, liThe Near East: The Searc"h for the 
Truth,1f Foreign Affairs, January 1952, pp. 261-263. 
~~---... --- ----- -~-.------ ----- ._-- .--- ._-
CHAPTER II 
,PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION 
Experts have established that a complete~y accurate 
translation is impossible. They may disagree on the merits 
of 'various translations, or the method to be used, but the 
,m~jority agree with $avory that "all translations seem ••• 
, 1 
to be simply an attempt to solve an insoluble problem~1I , 
~n thi~ chapter, however, ~e are dealing with ~ 'cer-
tain perspective on the problems of a particular tra'nslation 
rather than assembling facts about it. We are not concerned 
with t1:1;e ultimate psy'chological basis of the work, b,ut rath-
er with an attempt to at least touch upon some of the act~al, 
descriptive, or cultural problems of translating it. 
The main purpose of this chapter, then, is to show 
what are conceived by this translator as problems. In re-
ality, for instance, I find it very uncomfortable to hide 
,my biases, because ·no matter how hard I try, 'objectivity 
seems almost impossible. It is probably the 'same with some 
empirical studies, in which "non-mentalists," "objectivists," 
"behaviorists," or,scientists form their hypotheses ~n ad-
vance, then try as hard as they can to prove them right by 
I Theodore H. Savory, The Art of Translation (New York: 
Alden Press, 1959), p. 76 . 
. - .... ---~---
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fitting the data and all other aspects of the study into 
their preconceived notions. Indeed, one can deal on many 
different levels in explaining the problems of translation; 
- , 
but,what was very significant for me was to realize that 
the languages involved are made up of a unique total of 
cultural ties and philos~phies. Perhaps, then, any lan-
,guage can only be completely understood, in parts at least, 
in-its original form~ 
A translator must know both languages fluently. But 
unfortunately (or sometimes fortunately) he does not have 
the equivalent of all the components of one language in the 
second. Many times a term, a concept, or a word does not 
make sense in another language: consequently, the trans-
.1ator cannot totally duplicate the original. 'A translator 
partially observes, reads, or hears something in one lan-
guage, and if there is no equivalent in the second language, 
he tries to give his own interpretation of the original in 
the second language. Therefore, the translator is at times 
exposed to the same, or very similar concepts, and at other 
times he is faced with a concept, word, or term that has no 
,basis in another language. That concept is thus diffic'ul t 
or perhaps impossible to convey. This non-equivalence can 
occur in either direction between the first and second 
language. 
In this translation I have had these same problems. 
Translation is interpretation, but interpretation 'is not 
-- '''' __ ,. '..,'" '. ---o--.;:..-=­~--
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was allotted to payment of salaries, the average 
employee received less than $100 a month. 6 
3. Pursuit of a negative political equilibrium. 
Mossedeq tells how political equilibrium can take 
pl~ce in Iran: 
In my op~n10n, political equilibrium will take place 
in this country only when there are free elections. 
Negative equilibrium does not mean that any govern- . 
ment will bring all its fans to the Majlis. Negative 
equilibrium, however, -means that the government 
should not interfere with elections. The law of 
elections will be revised, which means that truly 
elected men get into the Majlis. That is when po­
litical equilibrium is achieved. Under this polit­
ical equilibrium, the problems of foreign govern­
ments, not with one but with all, will solve 
themselves. 7 
In a speech given in the Majlis on December 2, 1945, 
entitled "The Prevention of Issuing Oil Concessions,lI 
Mossedeq said: 
Whatever I have'said is in the best'interests of a 
country and its government that are 'seeking politi­
cal balance. If we pursue "positive politics," how­
ever, we must give a 92-year concession for the 
northern oil to achieve political balance (giving 
'the southern'oil to England and the northern to 
Russia). The people of Iran have never agreed, and 
now the Majlis disagrees about giving any oil con­
cess.ions. A. concession is much like a person who 
has lost one arm and now for the sake of better 
balance is willing to have the other arm cut off as 
well: a one-armed person is most likely in favor of 
6H• B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle. 
East in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 
1962), pp. 78-79. 
7Historical Speeches, p. 35 (my translation) • 
r' t: 
I' 
~ 
! 
i 
1 
r 
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~lways translation. Movazene Manfi in the Farsi language, 
literally,translated, is "negative bal~nce.n But Richard W. 
Cottam notes th~t this English translation 
-sounds like the doctrine of an irrational fanatic, 
and sin,ce this was the image of Dr. Mossedeq in many, 
Western minds the phrase was interpreted literally. 
In fact, however, re,sponsible Iranians have' never 
held such an idea. 2 
How can I explain the concept of "negative equilibri-
'urn" the way Mossedeq meant it in his language (Farsi),? In 
English positivist philosophy there is no basis, use, liking, 
acceptance, or tolerance for negativism. 
The word negative prejudices the English reader,before 
. 'he even fini'shes the sentence. What Mossedeq meant by nega-
tive'in the T~ird World is the most positive, phenomenon • e' e 
or should I expect an American with all his material comfort, 
or an Englishman with his positive philosophy, to look at 
things as would a man from the Third World? 
What Mossedeq is all about, what he devoted his total' 
being to, and why he is great is that he popularized the 
concept and philosophy of the Third World, that of a "nega-
tive equilibrium. II What he said in these two words to the 
Third World (and to his own people, who now appreciate him 
after many years, as the literature of intellectuals and 
2 Cottam, p. 202. 
9 
students allover the world demonstrates 3 has a world of 
~ositivism in it. Because the man from the Third World 
knows that through "negative equilibrium" he gets back, he 
" 
.receives, he achieves, he collects, he gains what is his . 
. right ·and belongs to him, but what has been denied him.. Ob-
.viously, getting, receiving, achieving, co~lecting, and 
,gaining are all very "po~itive" concepts in English~ but ,if 
.'1 say "negative equilibrium," still the .English reader will 
immed'iately think of a negative rather than a positive con-
cept. 
It took me so much explanation to say negative. in the 
first language means positive in the second language, but to. 
what degree have I succeeded? How well I have translated is 
not how well I have converted words and sentences, but how 
well I·have conveyed the deeper concepts. 
A perfect translation may be made from a short, easily 
understood writing. However, tpere are certain losses which 
occur in the connotative aspects of the work. It may lose" 
some of the hidden qualities recognizable only in the orig-
inal language. 
The more one enters into the spirit of the language he 
is reading, the more he appreciates the responsibilities of 
3MOSsedeq and Negative Equilibrium: A Discussio'n on 
Iran's National Movement Philosophy (Berkeley: Followers 
of the Third National Front, 1971), p. 39 • 
• • ______ _. _______ • ____ .........-______ • __ ff __ ' __ _
l . ~ . ____ _ 
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the translator, and realizes that many times it is impos-
sible to bring over into English the, he,art of the original 
construction. As "Herbert C. Tolman states in The Art of , 
~ust as the eye of the artist, which by training en-
ters more deeply into the soul of nature, realizes 
more than the inexperienced eye the difficulty of the 
task, and is more keenly aware of the powerlessness 
of the brush to portray all that is in the landscape, 
~o the trained translator appreciates how' exacting 
is his art. 4 
, Keeping in m~nd the exactness of the art of trans1a-
'tion, ,as a translator one finds two major. problem areas: 
'First, con~eptua1ization, or trying to portray the original 
concept as closely as possible, without getting 'mixed, in the 
,s~cond area, mechanics, which requires fo1lowinq the text, 
'word by word, as closely as possible. 
We have already seen an example of the problem of con-
,veying ~ertain deeper concepts from Farsi to English. As 
for the second problem, when the translator keeps too 'close-
1y to the text, he creates a mere mechanical reproduction. 
This "style" could be traced to the positivist tradition 
which still prevails in many universities, and provides us 
with bilingual publications that are distinguished 'by the 
'dullness of the English versions. Although such 
4Herbert c .. To1m'an, The Art of Translating (Boston: 
B. IL. Sanborn, 1901), p. 20. 
translations are accurate, this accuracy is. only in the 
meaning, not the spirit of the work. 
11 
The difficulty of word-by-word translation is illus-
trated by the Farsi word Tazahor. It has only the equiva-' 
~ent'ndemonstrationtl in English, which has negative 
political overtones of violence and destruction not shared 
'by the original. When Mossedeq used Tazahor in his speech, 
he was talking about his hopes that the people who were 
.listening'would express their opinions, voice their de-
.mands, and exercise t~eir constitutional rights and freedoms 
.. for. the betterme~t of their country. His usage thus con-' 
notes peace and constructivism. Perhaps the best transla-
tions are the result of the work of translators who 
consciously blend and balance these polar phenomena. 
CHAPTER III 
BIOGRAPHY OF MOHAMMED MOSSEDEQ 
Mohammed Moss'edeq was born in Tehran in 1879 into the 
,highest level of Iranian society. His family were land-
"owners, and his father, Mirza Hedayat, was a minister of 
, the court. His mother, Lady Najmol-Saltaneh, was related to 
the royal Q,ajar family. 
After graduating from high school, Mossedeq became" 
at'the age of seventeen, treasurer of the Khurassan prov-
ince. This. early political experienc~ left him ve~y disap-
pointed at the corruption in government; consequently~ he 
'returned to Tehran to take courses in a new school for gov-
ernment officials. Going to Paris for further studies, 
Mossedeq in 1906 received a diploma from the Ecole des 
'Sciences Politiques. He then studied at the University of 
Liege in Belgium and at the University of Neuchatel i,n 
Switzerland, where he earned a Doctorate in Jurisprudence 
in 1914. 1 
With his dedication, determination, family background, 
and education, Mossedeq was a logical candidat,e for the 
Majlis, the Iranian Houses of Parliament, to which he was 
1· Makan, p. 5. 
---.-.--.---~~ ---~-.-----. ---- -- ' -- ---
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elected in 1915 (the third Majlis). From 1915 to 1917, 
Mossedeq served on a committee that was studying the reor-
ganization of the Ministry of Finance. He held a high post 
in the Ministry of Justice from 1918 to 1919. 
In 1920, Mossedeq served as Governor-General in the 
province of Fars (Shiraz City), and in 1921, the first year 
Reza Khan was Minister of War, he was Minister of Finance in 
the cabinet of Qavam., In 1922, Mossedeq was Governor-
General of the province of Azarbaijan, whose Minister of 
~oreign Affairs he became in 1923. 
From 1924 to 1928 Mossedeq served as an elected deputy 
from Tehran to the fifth and sixth Majlis. In 192.5, ·as the 
outspoken leader of three other deputies, he debated against 
the passage of a bill to depose of the Qajar dynasty and to 
establish then Prime Minister Reza Pahlavi as Shah. 
~n this debate he made a very lengthy speech stating 
that the fundamental laws of the country must pe preserved. 
He insisted that these laws would be destroyed if the Qajar 
were removed and Reza Khan put in their place, adding that 
Reza Khan had been an effec:tive prime minister, but that as 
Shah he might become a dictator. And he warned, nthere is 
.no nation that has achieved any status under a dictatqr-
Ship.n 2 
2A Collection of Mossedeq's Historical Speeches (n.p.: 
.Organizations of the Iranian National Front in Europe, 1967), 
p. 15 (my translation). 
14 
Mossedeq was reelected to the sixth Maj1is, but Reza 
Shah saw to it that he was not elected to the seventh. In 
1928,' Reza Shah had Mossedeq first imprisoned and then ban-
ish~d to exile in Ahmadabad, an agricultural village owned 
by Mossedeq's family, about 100 kilometers from the capital. 
In 1936, Mo~sedeq~spent a month in Berlin for medical treat-
ment--he had suffered from poor health all his 1ife--~ft~r 
which he returned to the village. He then spent a few 
years of. enforced residence at Birjand in eastern Iran. 
In 1940, Mossedeq's son pleaded his· father's case 
; with Crown Prince Mohammed Reza. But the situation remained 
the same until 1941, when British and Russian troops occu-
. pied Iran: in August, Reza Shah abdicated and was succeed-
ed ,by his 2.2-year-01d son, Mohammed Reza Shah. Mossedeq, 
. ,upon direct orders from the new Shah, was immediately in-
,formed that he was free to live wherever he pleased. Years 
later, Mossedeq remembered his subsequent visit with 
Mohammed Reza Shah: 
I told :the Shah, "I shall never forget the kindness 
you have done for me in releasing me from your fath-
er's imprisonment. I have something'to say now that 
I have the chance. II The Shah said, "Go ahead, 
please." Then I proceeded: "You, Your Majesty, 
should not put yourself in the same category as your 
father, as you will go bankrupt. II The Shah said, 
"How will I go bankrupt?" I said, "Because your 
father has done things in this country that have 
caused him many enemies. It would be a wrong 
conclusion to say that anyone who was against your 
f~ther is against you because you are both Shah." 3 
Perhaps as a result of his own personal experience, 
15 I 
Mossedeq; as the above quotation suggests, was always in-
tere'sted in' the role of the Shah, especially as' far as the 
gover~ent'was concerned. On one'occasi6n, Mossedeq jus~i~ 
fied his view that the Shah should not interfere in 
politics: 
If a government position is available and ten people 
apply for it, then nine losers will become ~nemi~s 
of the Shah, and this number can be much greater in 
the case of choosing a deputy for the Majlis, since,' 
say, only one out of 135 applicants is chosen. But 
if the Shah plays a neutral role, soon everyone will' 
respect him, as the Shah should be respected by all. 
England is a perfect example, for the king' is removed 
from the running of government. If the English mon-
arch did this, it wouldn't be so bad for you to do it. 
You may think only Churchill and Atlee run ~he gov-
ernment, but really there are many more qualified men 
running the government. If a country doesn't have 
honest politicians it doesn't have anything ••• I 
don't think anyone loves his country any more than 
you, but if you don't have able men around' you!, wh,at 
will you accomplish?4 
Mossedeq consistently .and strongly pursued his beliefs 
throughout his long political career. Basically, there'~ere 
'three major areas with which his government's policy was 
concerned: 
i. Correction of all election laws. 
3Ibid ., p. 109 (my translation). 
4Ibid ., p. 112 (my translation). 
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Iran's bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape were 
.,notorious. Pro-western government o~ficials were elected in 
a most corrupted way, and very seldom was anyone sent to the 
. Majiis outside of the corrupt political machine. 
Mossedeq once spoke humorously of such corrupt el~c-
tions: 
It is well known that' after the 'seventh Majlis elec-
tion, the late Moddaress (in one of the most reli-
gious, honest and dignified statements of the time) 
asked the. chief of police, "In the sixth Majlis I 
had about fou~teen thousand votes. This time (the 
" seventh Majlis), I assume everyone was afraid of you 
and no one voted for me -- but I was wondering what 
happened to the one vote I gave myself~n5 ' 
2. Fight against corruption and bribery within the 
government.at all lev~ls. 
H. B. Sharabi, in Governments and Politics of The 
Middle Eastjn The Twentieth Century, explains the situa-
tion: 
Nepotism, bribery, and political favoritism are ac-
cepted as normal features of the administrative sys-
tem. It was estimated that in the late 1950s over 
200,000 persons, or about 10 percent of the male 
urban population of Iran, were employed by the gov-
ernment: 50 percent of these were superfluous ap~ 
pointments made on the basis of political interest 
rather than ·on administrative requirement. Moreover, 
about 30 percent of the bureaucracy was considered 
illiterate. Although nearly 70 percent of the na-
tional budget (excluding military appropriations) 
5Ib.id ., p. 14 (my translation). 
- - ..... -------~.---- .. ----
'was allotted to payment of salaries, the average 
employ~e received less than $100 a month. 6 
3. Pursuit of a negative political equilibrium. 
Mossedeq tells how political equilibrium can take 
place in Iran: 
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In my op1n10n, politic~l equilibrium will take.place 
in this country on'ly when there are free elect10ns. 
Negative equilibrium does not mean that apy govern~ . 
ment will bring all its fans to the Majlis. Negat1ve 
equilibrium,'however, means that the government 
should not interfere with elections. The law of 
elections will be revised, which means that truly 
elected men get into the Majlis. That is when po-
litical equilibrium is achieved. Under this· polit-
ical equilibrium, the problems of foreign govern-
ments, not with one but with all, will solve 
themselves. 7 
In a speech given in the Majlis on December 2, 1945, 
,entitled liThe Prevention of Issuing Oil Concessions," 
Mossedeq said: 
Whatever I have said is in the best' interests of a 
country and its government that are· seeking politi-
cal balance. If we pursue "positive politics," how-
ever, we must give a 92-year concession for the 
northern oil to achieve political balance (giving 
the southern oil to England and the northern to 
Russia). The people of' Iran have never agreed, and 
now the Majlis disagrees about giving any oil con-
I cessions. ·A concession is much like a person who 
has 'lost one arm and now· for the sake of better 
balance is willing to have the other arm cut off as 
well: a one-armed person is most likely in favor of 
6H• B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle. 
East in the Twentieth Century (princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 
1962), pp. 78-79. 
7Historical Speeches, p. 35 (my translation). 
,obtaining an artificial arm, if only for the sake of 
appearance. The one-armed person who wants his 
other arm cut off, however, would be better to give 
up the misery of life and commit suicide instead. a 
Mossedeq's opposition prevented his election'to the 
fifteenth Majlis.' He made known the responsib~e parties 
a~d went on,a food strike that lasted four days. In the 
,n~xt election, Mossedeq was a successful candidate. The 
national front headed by Mossedeq was a minority in the 
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Majlis. It consisted of seven deputies (out of 72), who 
made up a coa1ition 'of various political groups and parties 
(including the Tudeh, Iran's Communist Party). Despite his 
poor health, he was very-active and tqok many bills to the 
~ajlis, such as a bill to correct the election laws, a bill 
to ~e~cind the Shah's ability to close do~n the Majlis, and 
bills to prevent martia~ law and guarantee freedom of speech 
and of the press. Of these bills, only that removi'ilg the 
Shah's power to close down the Majlis was not passed. 
'A bill to nationalize.oil throughout Iran was taken to 
the Majlis on March 20,' 1951, where it was passed success-
fully. After the oil nationalization, Mossedeq a9cepted 
'the Iranian prime ministership, on condition that the 
Majlis would pass the "hands off" bill (the "hands'off" bill 
proposed was the enforced departure of the Anglo-Iranian 
-~--~- -_. __ .----------
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Oil Company and the discontinuation of diplomatic relations 
with the British).9 Mossedeq then began his government's 
. ' 
program of correcting Iran's election 'laws, described by 
Donald N. Wil~er in Contemporary Iran: 
Prop9sals for the ~eform of the electoral system 
were put forward. '. • • These proposals were not 
concerned alone with making electoral fraud more 
difficult~ but also envisaged steps to insure a 
more responsible electorate and a more representa-
tive list of candidates. The specific suggestions 
included limiting the electorate to literat~s, lim-
iting the number of candidates for each seat by re-
quiring an advance deposit which would be forfeited 
by those receiving the 'smallest number of vot~s, 
and by holding countywide elections on the same 
days instead of for a period of weeks, thus prevent-
ing candidates from running in several districts. 10 
There were many objections from the British government 
and its supp'orters wi thin the country to Iran's nationaliza-' 
tion of her oil resources. In October 1951, Britain took 
the matter to the International Court in The Hag'ue and 
later to the united Nations. Mossedeq personally appeared 
before both bodies. His claim was that it was not a case 
between two nations, but rather a case between a sovereign 
nation and a private oil company, and therefore not within 
the international court's jurisdiction. Mossedeq won his 
case at both courts. 
When Mossedeq returned to Iran, the opposition, both 
9 Speeches of Dr. Mossedeg in the Sixteenth Majlis 
'(n.p.: Mossedeq Publications, 1969), II, p. 136. 
10 ' Donald N. Wilber, Contemporary Iran (New York: 
Frederick A. Preager, 1963), p. 126. 
______ ~ ___ • ____ .~ w 
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from within and from without, was such that he resigned. 
But a 'bloody popular movement led to his return as prime 
minister. In addition, he took over the ministership of 
the Department of Defense. 
Mossedeq was opposed by England, the united ~tates, 
and by the Tudeh, each for its own motives. It is known 
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,that the Central Intelligence Agency, with the support of 
the United States government (and at a cost of 48 million 
dollars), planned a coup d'etat in secret. ll In August of 
1953, ,many of Mossedeq I s followers were captured; he lost 
his leadership, was tried in military court, and then was 
, sentenced to three years imprisonment. 
In 1957, Mossedeq was released from p~ison and moved 
to Ahmadabad under parole. He died a natural death in 1969. 
llA. Reza Arasteh, Man and Society in Iran (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1964), p. 110. 
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CHAPTER IV 
. TRANSLATION OF A SPEECHI BY MOHAMMED MOSSEDEQ,' 
PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN IN MAJLIS SHORAYE 
(The National Assembly of Iran) 
,ON JULY 11, 1952 
This speech. was given in the Majlis ten days before 
Mossedeq's resignation, which resul1;::ed in a people's upris-
ing to put him back in power. Ironically, The Hague 'Tri-
,bun'al's final decision regarding the controversy between Iran 
and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was announced on the. same 
date (known as Si Tir in Iran). Mossedeq managed to return 
to power. In addition, he took over' command of the Armed 
Forces, a role formerly exclusively the Shah's. 
The persuasive power of this speech has great histor-
ical'significance. 
~onorable representatives, you are aware that foreign 
political pressure and domination for many.years has de-
,pr~ved the people in our society of their freedom. We be-
came so weak and hopeless 2 that it was impospible to express 
an opinion or even verbally defend individual life and free-
dom. In this environment of fear, the bill for extension ~f 
'the oil concession passed without protest. The Majlis ·had 
no choice. I must comment also on the lack of awareness 
. shown by the Majlis as well as by the people of Iran. There 
was no chance of defeating the renewal of this horrible 
lThe Farsi text of this speech appears in M. Makan, 
A Look into the Life of Dr. Mohammed Mossedeq (n.p.: Iran-
ian National Front in Europe, 1964), pp. 41-50. 
2zaboon and bichare were used, which have alternative 
meanings of "poor," "needy," "helpless," n remediless,1I 
"despicable. 11 
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concession. Not only were the people unaware 3 of the poli-
tical disadvantages; but from the technical and the econom-
ical point of view, there was no chance for the people or ' 
their representatives to make a logical statement concern-
i~g the subject. 
At all times, the ex-British oil company4 used its 
.. entire force to keep the people of Iran in total ignorance. 
This was its attitude from the very beginning until the, day 
the company began discussing the renewal of its concession 
of 1933 for anoth~r t~irty years. 
In the same way, the company used its forces to de-
prive the people of any knowledge of their country's God-
givenS wealth of oil. With such tactics, it was able to 
'easily plunder this vast wealth. In other wo~ds, the com-
pany could, leave the poor people with empty pockets ,while 
'filling those 6f its greedy investors and capitalists. The 
unawareness and ign'orance of the Iranians continued, and 
without hesitation, the ex-British oil company stole our 
national wealth until the foprteenth session of the Majlis. 
In the fourteenth Majlis, the Soviet union found a good op-
.portunity to ask for an oil concession in the northern part 
3Alame-beekhabari"the world of ignorance." 
4 Mossedeq always refers to this company as the n ex-
British oil company," expressing the fact that it is no 
longer legal in Iran. 
Ssee the chapter "Rhetorical Analysis" for Mossedeq's 
usage of "God." 
.~ .. ---------. ------ --~-.-- ... - ---
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of the country. However, for the first time in the Majlis, 
the voice of the oppressed people of Iran started ringing 
.in·the ears of the people of the world. 
6 I attempted-to make the most of this situation by 
stressing the disadvantages of giving the north's oil con-
cession to the Russians. I also mentioned the loss result-
ing from the 1933 D'Arcy concession to the representatives 
in the Majlis. Furthermore, I reminded the members of the 
Majlis that this concession was brought to the Majlis, 
passed, and imposed' upon the people at a time and place in 
,history when there was no possibility of discussion and ex-
pression of opinions for the people or the representatives 
in the Majlis. 
Most important of all was the fact that not one ·rep-
resentative opposed the bill, and it passed immediately. 
Above all was the·fact that the bill for helping teachers, 
although most of its content had already passed, was with-
drawn at the suggestion of the Internal Revenue Secretary 
due to the hasty passage of the oil concession renewal. 
The verbal process has been recorded and is available to 
anyone. Also, note how they took advantage of the people's 
lack of awareness and th~ dictorial atmosphere. The con-
cession renewal bill was passed quickly in the Majlis and 
6 The pronoun "In can be expressed many ways in Farsi. 
---------
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was forced upon the people. Although the Russian request 
for the northern oil concession was discussed in the Majlis 
no one pursued the matter, with the exception of a few leg-
islators and editors of the press. One good thing did re-
sult from that situation: the people became more aware of 
their past carelessness. At least the people acquired some 
knowledge of oil. They 'realized the value of this national 
w~alth &nd 'how freely they were losing it. You respectable 
representatives remember the combat and struggle and how 
during the extension of the fourteenth session of the 
Majlis the representatives were very concerned over the in-
creasing ~wareness of the people. Gradually they were par-
ticipating in their own destiny and learning to voice their 
opinions. With the new awareness of the people, the repre-
sentatives to the Majlis began to worry about their re-
election. Therefore, against constitutional law, they 
'discussed the extension of the fourteenth Majlis. Not only 
was this a violation of the Constitution, it was against 
:public opinion as well. 
The first section of the Constitution provides that a 
new session of th,e Majlis will be postponed as long as for-
eign forces remain in Iran. My idea was to use the legal 
time for postponing the fifteenth Majlis and prolonging 
the fourteenth for two reasons. First, I wanted to correct 
the election process. Second, I did not want the new demo-
cratic freedom which was taking'place in the Majlis to be 
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interrupted, even for a short period of time. I kept wait-
ing for one of the political parties or people seeking cor-
rection, to say something or have some kind of demonstration. 7 
During the last days of the fourteenth Majlis, a group 'of 
1. 
people from the left political party attacked and stopped 
the Majlis from continuing their work. This action occurred 
at exactly the same time that one of the representatives of 
tpe major· world powers said that to improve relations with 
the go~ernment of Iran, he would be willing to speak with, 
the governor of Qavam-~not with anyone else (Qavamsolsal-
'taneh was the Prime Minister of Iran at the time). 
The left parties became more confident--not that 
Qayam's government was in a position to make the oil deals 
with Russia-~and' they did whatever they could to insult or 
threaten the representatives of the fourteenth Majlis. 
The fourteenth Majlis failed to have a majority present at 
any ~irne. A majority was not even present for the report 
of the Prime Minister on his trip to Moscow. 
After the election of the fifteenth Majlis, a change 
in government occurred. The Prime Minister fe~t more as-
surance regarding candidates. There were many direct and 
indirect activities to stop the minorities, who were against 
7unlike the Western concept "demonstration," which is 
a translation of the Farsi word, t'a'zahor means "expressing 
one's opinion openly" and is not necessarily associated with 
violence. 
.-------...----- --- _. --_ .. --
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any concession of oil, which was about to be given in the 
M~j~is. A few patriotic legislators were elected and found 
their way into the fifteenth Majlis~ The representatives 
',~f the people of Iran were aware that all the misery of'the 
people, whether in political or in economical matters" was 
because of the ex-British oil company. Consequently, pub-
lic opinion was strongly provoked against the extortionist 
.company. Furthermore, publ{c opinion was provoked to the 
extent that despite all the finagling to ensure the passage 
of. the concession, the bill still did not pass in the fif-
·teenth Majlis. Also, with all the interest that. the people 
'of Tehran showed in the election for the sixteenth Majlis, 
they succeeded in sending their own representative to the 
sixteenth Majlis, which was clear evidence of their deep 
'desire for cancellation of the imposed 1933 oil treaty. 
·Certainly. this eagerness existed throughout the country, 
. but the result was not as evident as it was in the capital 
city of Tehran. This is not the time, however, to explain 
·this. 
The people of Tehran elected their own representative, 
with the idea that before or after the election for the 
sixteenth Majlis, they would be able to voice their opinions 
concerning their own destiny. A few people gathered togeth-
er commenting on the fact that one must not forget the as-
sistance the press and the mass media had given toward 
.expressing public opinion. The strength they provided to 
-----. ---- --._-----------
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this type of activity has continued until today. The nation-
al plant of the Iranians is almost 'full grown, and I hope to 
God that'all the people of Iran will benefit from this as 
soon as possible. Therefore;, anyone who'says that popular 
demonstrations were against the interests of the country is 
terribly mistaken. B If the people had not gotten involved 
with political and social matters, the law nationalizing oil 
would never have passed, and no government would ever have 
objected to anything concerning the ex-British oil company. 
Whatever the government and the Majlis have done has been 
backed by public opinion. There was no doubt that the 
government and both Majlis (the Shorayeh Melli and the' 
~enate), when they are backed by the people, can talk, vote, 
and take steps for the interest of the country. 
The day after the, oil nationalization law was passed, 
I was asked to become the head of the government (Prime 
Minister). I accepted wholeheartedly, with a deep feeling 
of responsibi'lity. The request had been made previously 
when I was a congressman, but I did not accept the position 
at that time because I considered myself more usefut in the 
'Majlis. I had come to the conclusion that the national 
struggle must start from the 'Majlis, which was my reason 
for rejectirig the proposal of my being Prime Minister at 
BIID~monstrationU (tazahor) as -used in this context 
means a non-violent expression of the people for the better-
ment of the country. 
--~~--.------. ----- ----- -- --- ---
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that time. Now the result of that struggle is visible and 
is becoming a reality. Both houses of the Majlis have per-
formed their duty by enforcing the law in the manner pre-
s"cribed "by the law-makers. I could not keep still with "the 
end of "the road in sight and knowing how many had been in-
volved "with almost insurmountable proble~s. I was influ-
enced also by the prospect of the enforcement of the law 
bE?ing placed in the hands" of the weak, greedy, and sel.fish 
government under which the poor people of this country would 
not profit from their long struggle. 
This wa"s the only reason that I willingly accepted 
the difficult position of Prime Minister. I began to diag-
nose the work as any open-minded, intelligent, non-biased 
person would. I did not want" the government or cabinet to 
have anything else in mind except what would be in the best 
interest of:the country or the national wish. At the time, 
we needed a single aim uniting the country and providing 
internal peace. The smallest disagreement or episode could 
ruin the situation and create chaos. I chose reputable 
people from fine families with records of good health. 
These were people I was certain could help me in doing such 
an important task. Other corrections, such as social better-
ment, were certainly needed but could be acquired gradually 
in quieter times. 
It is no exaggeration for the members of the Majlis to 
say that the ex-British oil company is the main reason for all 
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the political, economical, and social problems in this coun-
,try,. It is a reality, and it is certain that if we sever 
the hands of this ex-British oil company from our country, 
no one person or government will be able to maintain the 
miserable condition of the past. 
Today the people of Iran have awakened. When the 
result of this struggle is evident, I hope to God, with the 
"present cooperation and unity, it will bring ~uccess. Not 
only will there be a hundied percent economic gain, but 
there will be twice as much non-material gain as well. It 
will bring awareness to the people and also make them take 
interest in their own future and destiny. No one can deny 
how important the people's awareness and involvement is for 
n.ational government. When a nation is united and at the 
, same time has a government by the people and for ,the people 
based on belie~ and'ide6logy rather than fear and force, 
,'they will never be under the attack 'and domination of 
others. Today, if we have the ex-British oil company domi-
nating and oppressing in political, economic, and social 
affairs of this nation, it is mainly because we. have neglect-
ed to 'realize our national power and have surrendered wi th 
our hands tied. 
In such important moments, God wanted the people to 
have the full scope of awareness and start walking in the 
path of truth. The Iranian people are awakened now, and 
they know the effect of a strong government backing up its 
---"--~-- -" -------
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oil corporation and threatening this nation with their guns. 
The nation of Iran is like a.member of the world's 
family and has no other goal except peace. If a national 
uprising started, it would have one aim only--asking for 
peace. But it is impossible to base peace in the Middle 
East on the present situation, in which there would be con-
stant danger of losing it. If the main aim or goal is to 
have the oil of Iran, as it was in the. past, for the use of 
the free.world, this also is our wish. We will do our best 
toward the same goal. Iran's government has said many' 
times that we are legally responsible to do everything in 
our power to prevent any interruption in the sale of oil to 
our buyers. 
My.government9 has been willing to cooperate in ensur-
ing proper .oil distribution because we do not want any inter-
ruption in its sale. However, the ex-British oil company 
J::las s.tarted many uncooperative activities which interfere 
·wi th this goal.. Let the world know that Iran's government 
is not responsible for any interruption in the distribution 
of oil. We have done everything within our power to con-
.tinue the work of the ex-British oil company. We even ac-
cepted their engineers with the same salary and the same 
benefits. We have enforced their rulings along with Iranian 
. laws. We sacrificed as much as we could--we do not have any 
9 "My government, It dolat Inj'aheb, suggests, when trans-
lated into English, an o'vertone of ownership of government. 
:However, as before, that is not the case in the original 
language. 
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laws. We sacrificed as much as we could--we do not have any 
more to give. We feel certain that world public opinion has 
discovered this fact. 
About the International Court at The Hague, I must 
say that Iran's government has always respected and obeyed 
the united Nations regulations. The gover~ent of Iran 
'has backed this international institution to the fullest 
extent~ and in the future, will always do the same. If 
this time the government of Iran did not listen to the 
forceful judgment of The Hague Tribunal, it is because we 
'have repeatedly announced that the government of Iran has 
'never signed a, treaty or a concession with the .government 
of England. pur opponent in this matter is a business 
corporation. 
It is very surprising that The Hague Tribunal did not 
.pay any attention to Iran's objection, and against the 
,basic rules of judgment, did not pass any opinion on our 
national government. lO In this way, they have shaken the 
respect of the small nations for the International Court of 
Justice. An international court must look to both strong 
and weak nations in the same manner. Such an international 
. court comes into existence for the purpose of maintaining 
lOThe British government took the matter to The Hague 
Tribunal. The court first passed judgment in England's 
favor, and only after Mossedeq's persistence did it retract 
its former decision, deciding "that it had no legal juris-
diction over the case" (John Marlowe, I"ran [New Yo~k: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963], p. 96). 
-----. --~-----.---- --_._- -< -~ ---
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peace in the world and to maint~in justice, especially for 
the,weaker countries. T~is kind of international justice 
court must follow a policy of equality for all nations, 
'large and small. If the small nations do not believe in 
the fundamental justice of such an institution, only God 
'k.'n,ows what disastrous results may occur. According to 
t~e basic laws of national government in our country, we 
have the right to ask that certain merchants leave our 
country because they prevent political and economic independ-
ence. We will reimburse them fairly for any loss. This, 
being the basic right of any nation, has been written in 
the principles of the United Nations. Therefore, if we 
l.ook at it on a realistic level, the denial of the judgment 
of the International Court of Justice shows our interest in 
these international institutions. Some of the nations of 
th,e world are doing- their best to make the International 
Court of Justice look worthless and represent it as an in-
strument of evil to the people of the world, when the evil 
is really of their own doing. 
I have definitely decided that with the backing of 
the people of Iran and of his Majesty the Shah, and with 
the support of both houses of the Majlis, according to the 
law, we cannot make the slightest move in the wrong direc-
tion. I will, do my duty with all my strength and persist-
ence. As long as I am traveling the difficult road that we 
have chosen and am encouraged and supported by public 
-.--~.---
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opinion, I am not afraid of any difficulty. I have no feqr 
at all, even if the British government and the ex-British 
oil company, by using various'means both within and out-
side of our country, are doing everything they can to 
overthrow my government. I will not weaken in this strug-
'gle. I am certain that it has arrived at a point where it 
must continue in the natural way until it reaches its goal. 
~ow I am very old-~the sun of my life has reached the edge 
"of the roof. Sooner or later I must go the way that every-
one has to go--die. 
However, whether I am dead or alive, I hope, in fact 
I am certain, that the fire that has start'ed will not die 
and will kindle a spark in' the men of this country to pur-
sue the national struggle until they acquire the de.sired 
'result. If we don't have freedom of action in our horne 
and foreigners dominate us with a rope around our neck 
pulling us to whichever side they wish, death is preferable 
'to such a life. The people of Iran, with such a brilliant 
historical past, and all they have done for the culture and 
civil,ization of the world, will never tolerate such a situ-
ation. Today our people have started a vast struggle, and 
no one is unaware of its importance. In this type of so-
cial movement, of course, one must be strong and re~dy to 
'suffer many deprivations. No struggle, regardless how 
.. _-------- .. ----_._----
34 
small, will be successful unless we work hard. Unless we 
do our best, we will accomplish nothing. ll 
Fo~ many years I have suffered from poor health and 
have learned that there are' two kinds of cures. There are 
cures that deal with, the origin of the sickness and also 
,cures for the result. 'Applying this theory to the problems 
of our country, I have proposed two categories which should 
ma,nifest a cure for the II sickness" of our country. One of 
, them is enforcement of the oil nationalization law and ban-
ishment of the ex-British oil company, because it is a 
'form of corruption against everyone. To achieve this goal we ,h 
we havecdone ~verything possible. There have been govern-
ment age~ts and members of special commissions appointed. 
I 
So far tliere have been no mistakes, and we are very hopeful 
this will continue until we achieve the.greatest possible 
success. 
The second basic cure, in my opinion, is to correct 
our election ,laws. A bill has bee~ prepared and proposed to 
the Majlis, and passing that bill is what the people expect. 
Of course, experienced representatives will participate in 
discussions regarding this bill. Their function is to pro-
tect the rights of the people. Future governments must 
conform to the new election laws, and the representatives 
'1lThis paragraph was underscored by the translator. 
It is frequently used by Mossedeq's followers as a slogan. 
------ -- -------'--------
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of the people have the responsibility of enforcing the con-
stitution, thus assuring Iran of a democratic form of govern-
ment. 
This government under no circumstances is willing to 
intervene in future elections; and as long as the oil situ-
ation is not settled this government will remain in power. 
Even, though I am weak, I will not step aside [the represen-
tatives shouted, "Well done!"] unless both M.ajlis should 
'request that I do so. As long as th~s hasn't occurred, I 
will remain until the conclusion of the oil business. If 
(God forbid) the oil business has not been settled by the 
date set, for the next election, the government will bring a 
bill to the Majlis to delay the elections. In this way, we 
ensure no interruption in the oil proceedings. Dear sirs, 
'if (God forbid) the situation regarding oil is prolonged to 
that point, there must be a delay in the election. Be as-
sured, however, that this government will bring a bill to 
the Majlis~ and if you gentlemen vote on it, of course the 
eiection will be delayed. [At this point Shoushtary com-
mented, "Why do you bring lifl into the situation?U] Be-
cause anyone can only be certain at the utmost of what he 
is doing, and I cannot trust the international situation. 
[Deputies: "You I re right! "] 
Although it is essential to deal with the cause of an 
illness, it is sometimes imperative to do whatever is 
necessary at the present moment for the general well-being 
--_._--- .. 
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of the sick person. One of the ways that our opponent has 
chosen to bring us to our knees and stop us from destroying 
the cause of the sickness of our country is to create prob-
. lems for our national budget and our country's economy. 
One problem regarding economy is the money exchange. 
This is d~e to the fact that we have not received any money 
from the ex-British oil company. The Iranian National Bank 
has reminded me of the situation by letter, and they have 
done a few things to eliminate the money exchange problem. 
The bank has directed the government's attention to 
this depression of foreign exchange and especially to "im-
ports •. After discussing the matter with the experts, a 
bill has been prepared which will provide a large part of 
the necessary imports for the country. The transfer of 
. guaranteed funds outside the country is a most appropriate 
thing to do, all things considered. 
Another problem concerns the nationalization of oil, 
the enforcement of ~he law regarding this and maintaining 
the vast refinery until normal business is resumed with our 
previous customers. This is essential in order to reach 
our ultimate national desire. We must be prepared to sac-
rifice. One of the important duties of every member of 
this nation is to help the national budget of the govern-
ment as much as they can. 
Fortunately, the peopl~ of Iran, with all the patriot-
ic emotion they have displayed in recent times, have proven 
____ • W ___ T _T -
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their loyalty to the government in time of disaster. In 
turp, the government has been worthy of their trust. As we 
have seen ' from the beginning of the deportation of foreign-
ers, unde,r the "hands off" policy, many ambitious people 
have willingly given all they had ,to the government., They 
, have offered everything, and this government with gratitude 
,has said, "Not yet, wait until we really need your help and 
We will utilize these individuals and groups." Until.the 
start of the oil sale to our foreign c~stomers, we must pro-
, vide budgets for all expenses. Right now our government 
income is not enough •. With the trus~ that we have in the 
faithfulness of the public, there is a bill written enabling 
us to borrow the amount of two billion rials. 12 
To overcome the problem resulting from lack of em-
~loyment we must do something immediately. Therefore, after 
long discussions with the Import-Export Bank of the United 
States, we have again discussed a credit in the amount of 
25 million for 15 years. This money would be used for 
agricultural machinery and road building. We must act upon 
this matter as soon as possible. By selling and distribut-
ing the agricultural machinery among our farmers, different 
types of crops can be harvested. It should reduce the 
volume of imported sugar and add to the level of our cotton 
l2The equivalent of approximately 2-1/2 million dollars. 
-- -- --
--- - -- -- ---- . ------------
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exports as well as other agricultural products. It should 
make us very happy that this credit from the U. S. Import-
Export Bank is no~ going to be spent for nonproductive ma-
terials, such as armaments. It will be spent for things, 
, that benefit the people, and as a result will considerably 
expand our total product10n level. 
Even though it seemed essential to rush these bills 
,through" you representatives should have enough time to 
study these subjects. Therefore, no pressure had been ex-
", ercised to pass these bills. They have been offered to the 
~ajlis in the regular way. Of course, the government ex-
pects a decision as soon as possible in order to achieve 
our goal. However, it depends upon factors such as the 
people's', will and also that they do their best to carry it 
out. ,Another important element is that foreigners will be 
unable-to do anything to ruin our work or destroy our unity. 
We must unite and not allow our deceitful opponent to get 
what he wants. You may be sure that the free world is back-
i~g us all the way, and that the name of Iran is held in 
'th~ highest esteem. 
In conclusion, I wish to relate a personal experience 
of some 50 years ago with men who had no conception of poli-
tics. Near the town of Qualeh Morqui was some land I had 
inherited; the' land next to it was called Gi. We had ex-
perienced some land disagreements. In my state then were 
two groups of peasants or farmers who were antagonistic 
- .-- -_ ... --
toward each other. If one day I assigned one group to do 
certain work, the other group would not go to work--until 
the time we had some disagreements with our neighbor. We 
had a discussion and the farmers from both groups said, 
'" n Previous ly when the landlord told us to do some work in 
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our village, because of our antagonism, one group would go 
.tq work and the other would not. But that was in our own 
village. Now this disagreement is outside of our village, 
and the v,illage is the base of our life. So we must unite, 
: and following the order of the landlord, go and fight." 
Whep peasants who know nothing about politics and who 
are disagreeing among themselves can have such a sincere 
feeling of unity and togetherness, the same things can be 
experienced by other groups. We must not expect the two 
houses of the Majlis, the Shorayeh Melli and the Senate, and 
,.also the press in this country, not to verbalize their in-
'ternal problems. However, when the government has a dis-
agreement with some foreign power, it should be the right 
and privilege of everyone to unite with his government. 
I do not say that in this government there are no mis-
takes, but it is our task to correct those errors. If we 
succeed in this task, the people of Iran will be able to 
accomplish anything. 
Improvements require money. Much of the time of this 
government is spent on things resulting from unemployment. 
, , 
For ,exampl'e, a great deal of time was spent on the factories 
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of Isfahan and Azarbaijan because they were closed down. 
,Any improvement requires money, and this problem is 
,not solved by'eliminating a few employees or transferring' 
them from one place to another. If you have credit and 
capital, plan the production expenses within the countryF s 
',budget and put the people to work. As soon as possible, 
the people will leave government work and start other en-
terprises. People today want to get a job with the govern-
ment because of poverty. 
We have collected many documents cO~gerning the inter-
ference of the ex-British oil company. It has dominated our 
political and social life and committed many other wrongs. 
If one day the governme~t of England takes Iran to the 
United Nations and registers a complaint, that day these 
documents will prove how much the ex-corporation has done 
" ,against this country's internal affairs and how it has 
'ruined our lives. ,At such a time, the free nations of the 
world will know the truth, and they can better judge the 
situation. Those documents are not provided to our fellow 
countrymen. If England should take us before the United 
Nations, then we can submit them to let all the world know 
the position of this poor nation (Iran). In 50 years Iran 
has lost everything to thi's ex-company. Anyway, dear sirs, 
these documents are not collected for the people of this 
country • 
. _--- -------- ... _---
I say it's good if you gentlemen do not mention the 
matters which bring disagreement among us in the Majlis. 
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Of course I do not want to say that because the oil situa-
tion is in process we must do wrong things. We must do the 
right thing as well as doing all we can for the oil situa-
:t:;ion--go forward. [Shoushtary interjected a comment, nDear 
Doctor, disagreement is bad. Stop the reason for it."] 
No m~~ter how much happens in this Majlis, all of ,the 
disagreement within the Majlis will serve the ex-British oil 
company. If you gentlemen agree, once or twice a week'we 
can have the vice-secretaries of the different ministries 
gather in the Majlis to discuss their ideas with one anoth-
er. 
If you gentlemen have any opinions concerning improve-
ments in your own locality, I have no objection whatsoever. 
'I want to see these things done, but gentlemen, please do 
not disturb the Majlis. In the Majlis everyone should 
totally support the government. If at any time you should 
decide that this government should not remain, first discuss 
it and then with one vote you can get rid of the government. 
Personally, God knows, I would be very grateful to you 'be-
cause, with my illness, work is difficult. However" this 
is my national duty and inspires me to continue. 
I am asking all the vice-ministers ,to gather any time 
they want in the Majlis and answer any questions you may 
have. If they do not convince you with their answers, you 
--_.-_ ... -
---~ .. --- . 
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gentlemen can come directly to me. If I personally do not 
do anything about it, then go to the Shoraye Melli and dis-
cuss those matters. If we do it in this way, first of all 
it will not take the Majlis' time needlessly. Secondly, 
you will not become famous among the people for objecting 
to this government which is struggling with the ex-British 
oil company or perhaps for doing something against the 
national government. 
God knows whatever I have said, I said it for you, 
and not for myself. 
------_ .. -
CHAPTER V 
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS 
To analyze Mohammed Mossedeq's rhetoric properly, one 
must understand the background and the environment thor-
oughly. For example, the translated speech was inspired 
in large part by the conflict between Iran and the oil 
interests of the British government. In addition, one 
must understand that there are several possible ways of 
',performing a rhetorical analysis, all within the meaning of 
the word rhetoric. However, in a study with a limited 
scope such as this one, the rhetorical analysis, though of 
vital importance, has to be limited to a discussion of the 
-major aspects of the speech under consideration. 
There are very few English language sources on 
Mohammed Mossedeq which are not written by historians or 
political scientists. Unfortunately, in the available lit-
erature, the most important characteristics of the man have 
been ignored. In order to understand another culture, one 
must overcome one's own cultural boundaries. And this is 
rarely achieved, since language and culture are inseparable. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study my research was 
done mainly from the original literature. 
-----~. --- .-~ -- --
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The ~riginal Farsi materials by and large are of two 
types (since 1953). There is the collection of several 
volumes of the actual speeches taken from the press and 
the Majlis records, and there is the rhetoric of Mossedeq's 
devoted followers ,. which obviously is biased in his favor. 
However, in recent years Mossedeq's student followers have 
. developed an intellectual ~pproach to their own biases. 
That is, they have found a rationale for the movement 
Mohammed Mossedeq initiated. 
One of the latest accomplishments of these students 
is their 'international model based on Mossedeq's philosophy. 
This model forms the basis for current discussion with1~ the 
framework of nationalistic movements, which is most helpful 
for the present type of study, and, more important, for the 
awareness of the world. 
Because Mossedeq's speeches involve many years, many 
different occasions, and many different subjects, it is im-
possible to choose one or several speeches to translate 
and come up with a just example of Mossedeq's rhetoric. 
-However, the speech chosen for translation, taken trom the 
period in which Mossedeq actually achieved some of his ob-
jectives, ~as selected for its concluding and summarizing 
merit as far as Mossedeq himself was concerned. There is a 
verified text of the speech, as well as recordings of it. 
This speech was delivered as most of Mossedeq's speeches 
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were--partially prepared and partially extemporaneous. 
All Mossedeq's speeches were delivered around the same 
philosophy and toward the same goal as this particular 
speech. Its purpose, both generally and specifically, was 
to bring political awareness to the people's representa'tives 
i~ the Majlis as well as to the public, by means of the 
mass media press and the'national radio stations. Because 
,'there was no television at that time, the radio played a 
great role in getting his message to the public. l 
The speech also seems intended to convince and per-
suade the people and the nation as a whole, as well as the 
Third World nations, to be involved in, choosing their own ' 
destiny. His purpose was, therefore, to inform people, to 
make them aware, then to persuade and convince them to act 
upon their principles. Unlike what we find in the views of 
some historians and political scientists, such as that 
Mossedeq did everything to keep himself in power, this 
speech shows that his purpose, in reality, was just the op-
posite. He portrays a humble, selfless type of'person in 
'this speech when he says, II . if you donrt want to do 
this which seems right to me, you, the representatives of 
the people ,. can impeach my government and someone else can 
come and do the job. n2 
lIn Iran, the national radio stations have been very 
popular as a media tool. 
2 Makan, p. 47. 
---~--.-
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In classifying the speech, one should categorize it 
as policy forming and professional, rather than ceremonial. 
or social. The speech begins by conveying the horrors of 
foreign domination with its lack of freedom, the most im-
portant ingredient of the people's life. Then the speaker 
deals with the mistakes of statesmen and governments which 
had yielded such terrible results. He explains to the im-
mediate audien~e3 just how much responsibility 1ay with the 
Majlis and how they, the audience, could have prevented all 
those mistakes by acting under Iran's policy regarding for-
eign' powers within the country. The speech strongly speci-
f~es the losses that the people had to suffer because of 
their own lack.of political awareness and, even more so, 
because of that of the dishonest representatives within the 
government. Not so much in this speech but in other 
4 
speeches, Mossedeq very openly admits the corruption of 
the government officials, or the so-called people's repre-
sentatives, and its terrible consequences. 
The chosen speech shows that the speaker has a deep 
political awareness and illustrates how clearly he could 
see the situation--specifically, how the Tudeh (Iran's 
Communist ~arty), the only well-organized political party 
that Iran has ever had, had obstructed the nationalistic 
3Although this speech'was formally addressed to the 
members of the Majlis, it was also directed to the populace, 
who formed an audience outside the building and listened 
to the speech over loudspeakers. 
4Speeches of Dr. Mossedeq in the' Sixteenth Majlis, p. 9. 
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goals by opposing both Mossedeq's nationalistic government 
and ,the minority in the Majlis. The speech exp1ains that 
no matter how litt1e was the awareness of a few people in 
,the past, it had been extremely helpful to a nationalistic 
gqvernment. Consequently, how much better it would be for 
the people, the press, and the mass media to pursue those 
-activities which help the nationalistic government. An 
early par,t of the speech establishes the tho~ght that an' 
a~~reness of political reality can only be advantageous for 
the people and the country. 
One must note that Mossedeq, throughout his long 
life and political career, always was a law-abiding man who 
wanted to see that everything went according to the regula-
tions. This was true until the very last moments of his 
life, when he began' to support the ideology that people 
should get what is theirs by any'means necessary. The 
speech in question ~omes when Mossedeq was younger, however, 
and therefore its constant theme is to act according 'to the 
constitution and other laws of the land for which so many 
good men were sacrificed. 
The central theme of this speech deals with an histor-
ical analysis of what has happened, what is happening, and 
what will happen by p~rsuing certain policies. After estab-
lishing the historical facts and explaining what has hap-
pened politically, economically, and socially under a non-
nationalistic policy that did not have the peop1e's interest 
------------~~-----
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at heart, the speech relates the issue of the rights of the 
people to the present situation. Mossedeq explains that 
'ea~lier his government had even been willing to go along 
with certain demands of foreign powers to show that he was 
only interested in getting the people their rights, not in 
imposing anything on otner nations or their corporations. 
The speaker, throughout his speech brings about an 
awareness that international courts of law are not neces-
~arily always just institutions. It could very well be 
that The 'Hague Tribunal was not just in taking England's 
side and ignoring Iran's government, simply because England 
was a world power. And the government of England had no 
right backing a corporation that, as.a private company, 
legally had nothing tq do with them. 
To explain how the government of Iran was justified 
~n not recognizing The Hague decision as either just or 
unjust is simple. The matter should never even have been 
.submitted to the International Court of Justice, since it 
was not within its legal jurisdiction. It would have been 
within the International Court's purview had it been a case 
of two sovereign nations having problems with one another; 
but it was instead the sovereign nation of Iran opposing 
a private oil company. Mossedeq's speech reached its 
climactic point and greatly excited his audience when he 
declared, first of all, that the British government had no 
right,to take such a matter to the International Court, 
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second, that it was not within the Court's jurisdiction, and 
finally, that it was the r~ght of the government of Iran to 
refuse to accept the decision. 
The speech had succeeded by this point at logically 
relating the seemingly isolated conflict between the private 
'oil'company, England, and the sovereign government of Iran 
to,' the international situation. Then the speech ,expresses 
. how surprising it is to find such a mockery of justice with-
in the International Court of Justice. It goes on to sug-
gest that if these are the kinds of decisions made, then the 
peoples ,of the world, mainly th~ Third World, should not 
'and will not trust such institutions in the future. Once 
! 
I 
these small nations recognize t~at the International Court 
only takes the side of the world imperialists, then they 
will not believe in it any longer, which will be disastrous 
for the world peace. (In the end, however, Mossedeq, through 
his persistence, logic, and knowledge of international law, 
won. ) 
The speech concludes that it is unjust for people to 
be underdogs; when the people decide they can achieve their 
goals and assume their rights, then it is time for them to 
act accordingly and avoid the mistakes of others in the past. 
In other words, "where there is a means, there is a way" 
could very well express the level of political awareness 
that Mossedeq was trying to convey in his speech. 
---_ .. _-
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The language of the speech creates a mood of sincerity, 
a tone of determination and belief in just principles. It 
moves the audience to the point that it doesn't really mat-
'ter if the speaker is alive or dead, for it is the task 
which remains always important, it is the task which must be 
pursued. The speech stresses the importance of being aware 
.of just principles and tries to persuade the audience to 
take action. 
Persuasion, by means of force or threat, is not typi-
cal of Mossedeq. However, he used concrete objects, especi-
'ally his cane,S to stir the people and their represenfatives 
to feel the absolute necessity of the struggle againE!t im-
peri.alism and how worthless life becomes without dignity 
and freedom, the most sacred parts of a man's life. 
The main effect of the logic of this speech lies in 
the changing of a theoretical reality into a practical 
reality that is far more meaningful to the masses. 
Mossedeq's speeches cannot be ignored as far as technical 
and psycholqgical appeals are concerned. The speech con-
stantly reminds the audience of the speaker's as well as 
the people's interests, beliefs, motives, and desires. 
SThis writer observed on several occasions Mossedeq 
as he delivered a speech, at the highlight of which he would 
oft·en point the cane at the audience or the sky. Many times 
to emphasize his illness and frailty, he would lean on it. 
------ -----
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More important, though, is that the speaker is highly aware 
of his audience as a Middle Eastern people who are constant-
·ly relating on a highly emotional level with most matters 
of life. It is a well-known characteristic of the speaker 
that if it became necessary he would cry, faint, or actually 
become p~ysically inoperative. Because Mossedeq was so 
deeply committed to whatever he said, emotional appeals 
·played a very important part of his delivery. 
Mossedeq's personal credentials at the time of the 
speech were a matter of divided opinion. His integrity 
~nd loyalty were not denied, and perhaps were even sup-
ported, by his opposition. His experience was also known 
and accepted in all camps. It was his judgment that was 
questioned by his opponents. But through his speech one 
comes to the conclusion that the speaker's judgment could 
not have been so far off if for half a century of experience 
he had proved his loyalty, honesty and integrity. 
The language used in this speech is highly communi-
cative for the speaker used a very simple, down-to-earth 
language. Only seldom would Mossedeq quote from the Koran 
-or other highly accepted sources. However, he does make 
frequent reference to God, whicp has cultural and psycho-
logical significance for an Iranian. It-reinforces the 
speaker's ethics and religious beliefs, as well as his good 
standing with God, which is mutually accepted by the speaker 
--~- ,_.- - -
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and his audience. The language of Mossedeq is very direct 
and forceful; yet his choice of words and his sentence 
- structure are very simple and easily understood. Although 
the nature of Farsi is to be very redundant, Mossedeq's 
speeches, even when he was dealing with highly technical 
material, were, for the most part, not at all boring. They 
'" we:r;e al so well unders tood by his audiences, who were large-
,ly illiterate. 
Due to the characteristics of his delivery, such as 
the way he communicated with his audience, his poise and 
gestures, as well as the simplicity of his articulation and 
his calm voice,6 Mossedeq would draw a vast number of people 
outside the Majlis. ' They would listen to his words through 
tbe loudsp~akers, applauding frequently, and it seemed that 
-the crowd did not need to listen to every word, since every-
one listening seemed to know exactly what he would say next. 
The immediate effect of the speech was often that the crowd 
would bodily carry him quite a distance after he appeared at 
the entrance to the Majlis. One must appreciate that the 
public support Mossedeq received had not been experienced 
by any Iranian statesman before this time. 
Perhaps the most important part of rhetorical ~nalysis 
6Mossedeq was well-known for his steady, calm voice 
(except when he became highly emotional). This writer has 
,three recorded speeches. It is interesting to note that it 
was the content of the speeches more than his vocal theat-
rics, which triggered reactions from the crowds. 
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is ~he s-tudy of effect: whether there are ultimate or im-
mediate effects of the speech. The effect of Mossedeq's 
speeches was quite unusual. For over a century no spokes~ 
man, statesman, polit~cian, or ordinary man from the . 
Middle East had been so effective in bringing an awareness 
and understanding of the international situation to the 
people, of whom the majority were very politically unaware, 
as well as to their representatives who were so corrupted. 
The effectiveness of Mossedeq's speeches was of such a 
high degree that by rhetoric alone was he able to gain the 
. public support of Iran. Moreover, he was one of the 
father-initiators of the movement of the oppressed peoples 
of the world against imperialistic powers. Due in part 
-to Mossedeq's long-range influence, more than fifty dominated 
nations, who were nothing more than colonies, in essence, 
have achieved their sovereignty. 
This writer finds it difficult to form a 'value judg-
ment of this speech or other speeches made over half a 
century by Mossedeq. However, it is evident that through 
his philosophy, speeches, and writings, Mossedeq was able 
to inspre the people to realize that before all else they 
must "become themselves" to succeed. It is not only in 
this one speech but in all of Mossedeq's speeches that 
such a deep theme comes clearly across: If the people do 
not have freedom on all levels, then death is preferable. 
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Mossedeq convinced the people he wanted to convince; thus 
his.torically, he becomes very significant. 
With his most basic human tool, his language, Mossedeq 
was highly successful. But his success in persuasion re-
flects not only rhetorical merit but also a high level of 
literary merit. After twenty years, history shows that 
what this man started in his speeches has not died or faded 
away with the speaker's death. He says in the very high-
.. 
light of his speech, "whether I am dead or alive I hope, in 
fact I am certain, that this fire will never die away and 
that the awakened men of this country will pursue the na-
tional struggle until they achieve their goal.,,7 As 
'one young Iranian put it, "The life of thoughts does not end 
w'ith the death of the thinker; thoughts make history and 
endure for cent'uries. Mossedeq through the school of 
Mossedeq and the school of Mossedeq through the followers 
of that school are alive forever." 8 
7 Makan, p. 46. 
, . 8Mossedeq and Negative Equilibrium, p. 39 (my trans-
latl.on). 
----- ----------- -
CHAETER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In presenting 'the translation and analysis of a 
speecp by Mo?ammed Mossedeq, we first introduced the sub-
ject· and basic characteristics of the spee9h and then jus-
tified a. study of this type by virtue of the misconceptions 
,about Mossedeq held in Western societies. A short biography 
then aealt with Mossedeq's place in history and with the 
biographical significance of matters concerning him. The 
next chapter discussed how c~ltural and philosophical dif-
ferences affect translation and how this translator had to 
, face certain practical problems. The main body of this 
study, the translation, was then offered. It was, as 
previously mentioned, difficult to select a speech 'that 
would provide a ~rue example of Mossedeq, who created and 
pursued the same philosophy with the same rhetoric for over 
half ·a century. In the "Rhetorical Analysis" chapter we 
attempted to systematically analyze Mossedeq's speech. 
In this conclusion, we intend to discuss Mossedeq's dis-
course, values, and uniqueness, which have affected not 
onl'y Iranians but the whole Third World as wel1. 
It is important to note that ~-1ossedeq, from his 
early years, 'recognized the basic problems of his poor and 
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deprived country. These problems were, as he mentipned many 
~bi;!'. ,I'~~\\ 
. ~~~ ~ times throughout his career, first, the fore~gn pO'wer,S. 
(wo:r;-ld imperia,lists, dominated by England), with their 
ruthlessness and their dishonest economic pOlicies. 
Se'cond was the, total corruption wi thin the Iranian goverri-
ment--bribery, dishonesty, and imperialistic dea~ings for 
p~.rsonal gain of the ruling· cla'ss against their own people. 
·Thiro. was the lack of awareness and education of his people, 
which made Mossedeq's task in combating the problem v~ry 
difficult. As a solution for the first problem--impe·ri-
alistic domination and interference with the internal af-, 
fair,s of a small nation--Mossedeq pursued the philosophy 
of negative equilibrium, in line with his feeling that po-
, litical equilibrium is a necessity. 
, The first step Mossedeq took was the nationalization 
of all natural resource~, mainly oil, throughout Iran, and 
'the dismissing of all agents of foreign governments, mainly 
England's. As for the second problem--the corruption within 
his small country's ruling class--he, in contrast to the' 
tratlition of the ruling class of Iran, lived a very simple 
and absolutely honest life. He pursued a constant course 
of action, of which the highlight was the correction of the 
election laws on all levels. ' In doing so, he set an 
example himself. 
-_ ........ _ ...... "" .......... _-- - --- - '" 
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The third problem--the lack of political awareness and 
eduq~tion of his people--is a very significant and compli-
, 
cate4 problem for any educator. Because of this lack, 
Mossedeq actually did many things he did not ta1k about, 
such as allowing the people more freedom of action, speech, 
. 'and press than what might have seemed necessary at the 
'time. He also allowed the mass media, .particularly the 
pr~~s, a,nd political groups of different camps to go to 
extremes and even criticize him' personally. A11. of this 
h¢lp'ed improve the people's understanding and awareness 
qy exposing many hidden problems. 
Mossedeq's goal, specifically as well as generally, 
was the helping of non-privileged people, not only in Iran 
but in the entire Third World. Mossedeq was perhaps the 
best thing that has happened in contemporary history to 
the Iranian nation. Like many great men of the world, his 
,'unselfish, down-to-earth attitude is certainly worthy of 
rec~gnition, especially since he was from the highest level 
of his society. In one of his speeches he said, " ••• may 
God damn those who in these desperate days of our nation 
make a statue of me."l 
It is clear that not only did Mossedeq have a strong 
nationalistic attitude, having organized the philosophy of 
negative, equilibrium based on redi~covering one's self 
through political and economical independence, he also had 
IMoSsedeq and Negative Equilibrium, p. 39 (my translation). 
-------
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a.universal outlook on the world situation. Mossedeq knew 
v~r¥ well that socio-economic change, the struggle for free-
dom,,. dignity, and independence, is not only an Iranian 
problem but also that of the Third World. Thus, when he 
became Prime Minister of Iran, he sent a telegram to I.:r:an' s 
chief delegate to the Seventh Assembly of the United Nations, 
saying, 
~ecause one of my government's basic foreign policies 
is to help nations who are struggling for their 
.right of independence, when Morocco and Tunisia's 
groblems are discussed in the united Nations, you 
are di.rectly ordered to give any possible help to 
the deprived ~frican nations who are asking for 
their sovereignty. Furthermore, since the mention-
ed countries 'do not have representatives in the 
United Nations, announce officially that Iran's 
government is wholeheartedly willing to have their 
innocent voice reach the ears of the world's people 
from the Uni.ted' Nations podium. (Signed) The ~rime 
Minister, Mohammed Mossedeq. October 14, 1952. 
Because of the misconceptions about Mossedeq in the 
West, many scholars look at the man from ,a different point 
of view. Most available English language sources are pro-
imperialism and anti-Mossedeq. This makes a study of the 
present kind (which is biased toward Mossedeq) justified. 
For the most part, the final chapter of Mossedeq's political 
career is either not mentioned or misconstrued. The fact 
remains that after the oil nationalization, Mossedeq 
trust.ed the United States to assist his nationalistic gov'-
ernment at least economically and to stop England, which at 
2 Ibid., p. '47 (my translation). 
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that- time had her gunboats pointed at Iran's shore on the 
Perpian Gulf. The United states, instead, while giving 
sup~rficial hopes to Mossedeq, in reality cut off all of 
lran's foreign aid and gave an enormous amount of credit 
to England to buy all of the oil products she needed from 
'the western hemisphere. And if that wasn't enough, the 
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,Uni't;~d States, through the C.I.A., then planned an illegal 
coup~d'etat to overthrow Mossedeq. With the he1p o~ the 
C.I~A., Iran's ruling class captured Mossedeq and placed 
him in prison. 
In the final analysis, as biased as it seems, what 
condemns Mossedeq is what he fough~ for all his life. The 
,mistakes Mossedeq is charged with are the trust he put in 
his friendly appearing enemies, in the corrupt ruling class 
of Iran, and in the United states government, which spoiled 
Mossedeq's dreams and, through the C.I.A. scandal, cost 
him his government. As far as the American government is 
concerned, my point is best made by Richard W. Cottam: 
" .•• the paradox is that in the interest of combating com-
,munism, the United States has been pursuing a policy of 
economic determinism that might well produce not a Nasser 
but a Castro-type leadership.,,3 
In spite of all of these setbacks and problems, 
3 Cottam, p. 319. 
I I.', 
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Mo·ss·~d..eq, in half a century, motivated millions to begin the 
str~;Igle for their freedom by non-violent means within the 
law., . He a'cted upon whatever he said, and through his ac-
~ions, he achieved the highest goal that he had wanted. He 
then said, nWha:t else can I ask for, when in my own lifetime 
I ~ee the struggle that we have started is now in progress, 
and people are pursuing what is their 'right, and the fire 
which has started will neyer die. n4 
In Iran, a nation of 30 million people, more than 60 
per~~nt of. the populat.ion live in rural areas, and more than 
80. percent are illiterate. These, however, are fairly recent 
figures. Twenty years ago they were much higher and, in 
fact, the illiteracy and rural living patterns enabled the 
Wesbern imperialists to dominate the country, thereby forc-
ing their separatism policy successfully among the people. 
l 
It was at this time and under these conditions that Mohammed 
Mossedeq managed to bring awareness and unity to his people 
i~ order that they would defeat the foreign powers within 
and without their country. Although these foreign powers 
'gained back their role, by legal or illegal means, 
Mossedeq's ideology remains popular today not only among 
his people but a good portion of the Third World as well. 
4MOssedeq and Negative Equilibrium, p. 14 (my trans-
lation) • 
I . 
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Richard w. Cottam has probably done one of the most 0 
ob'j~'ctive studies concerning Iranian nationalism. He 
stq.tes, 
,. • • Mossedeq had ceased being just another Nation-
alist leader. He had become the symbol of Iranian 
nationalism: anyone daring to strike at this symbol 
must suffer .the consequences. 5 
5cottam, p. 154. \ 
\ 
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